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Recent Cases
CIVIL PROCEDURE - "ANCILLARY" VENUE IN
THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE IN MISSOURI
State ex rel. Garrison Wagner Co. v. Schaaf'
Novoson Investment Trust, Inc., lessor of a building located in the
City of St. Louis, filed suit in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County against
its lessee, Emerson Electric Co., for an alleged breach of maintenance
and repair covenants in the lease. Emerson Electric Co., a corporation
located in St. Louis County, filed a third-party petition impleading its
sublessee Garrison Wagner Co., which had taken possession of the premises
subject to similar maintenance and repair obligations. Garrison, served
at its office in the City of St. Louis, sought dismissal of the third-party
petition for improper venue and lack of jurisdiction.2
Garrison asserted that venue was improper on the ground that neither
the general venue statutes nor the special corporations venue statute4
authorized suit against Garrison in St. Louis County, although venue was
proper as between the parties to the original claim. Garrison contended
that the general venue statute was controlling and, if not, that the cause
of action accrued or would accrue in the City of St. Louis for purposes
of the corporations venue statute. The Missouri Supreme Court, in an
original proceeding in prohibition, assumed that the cause of action
accrued or would accrue in the City of St. Louis and that the venue as
to Garrison would therefore be improper under the corporations venue
statute.5 The court held, nevertheless, that venue need not be independent-
ly established in a third-party petition but could rest on venue properly
1. 528 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
2. In Missouri, the service of process in a county of improper venue may be
quashed, so the venue objection results in a want of personal jurisdiction. See
notes 10-17 infra.
3. The general venue statute, § 508.010, RSMo 1969, provides in part:
Suits instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise provided by law,
be brought:
(1) When the defendant is a resident of the state, either in the county
within which the defendant resides, or in the county within which the
plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found; ..
4. The special venue statute applicable to corporate defendants, § 508.040,
RSMo 1969, provides:
Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where
the cause of action accrued .... or in any county where such corpora-
tions shall have or usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of
their usual and customary business.
5. In State ex rel. Baker v. Goodman, 364 Mo. 1202, 274 S.W.2d 293 (En
Banc 1954), the court held that when two corporations are joined as defendants,
§ 508.040 is controlling, not the general venue statute, § 508.010, which governs
when corporations are joined with individual defendants. The Garrison court felt
that in the impleader action, Goodman required it to look to the corporations
venue statute.
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RECENT CASES
shown in the original claim. Therefore, a third-party petition may now be
allowed in Missouri even though the statutory venue requirements would
not be met if the claim asserted in impleader was brought in a separate
action.
The Missouri impleader rule6 is silent on the question of venue in
third-party practice. While rule 41.01 authorizes a liberal construction
of the procedural rules, rule 51.01 cautions that they are not to be in-
terpreted to extend the venue limitations.7
In addition to those competing textual attitudes concerning construc-
tion of procedural rules, the Missouri decisions are uniform in holding
that the rule governing service of process is subject to the statutory venue
requirements, 8 despite the language of the service rule allowing service
of process anywhere within the state.9 The consequence of modifying
the service rule by the venue statute is that in Missouri, venue is juris-
dictional. Proper venue is necessary before service of process will confer
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.10
It is generally accepted that venue and jurisdiction are distinct con-
6. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 52.11 (a). The pertinent text of the rule, identical to
FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (a), is as follows:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and petition to be served upon
a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all
or part of the plantiff's claim against him .... Any party may move to
strike the third-party claim, or for its severance or separate trial.
The rule is based upon the theory of indemnification express or implied in
lav. Wright, Third Party Practice-Non-Contractual Indemnification, 28 Mo. L.
REv. 307 (1963). The substantive basis of a right to indemnification may be in
contract or it may arise by operation of law. For rights of indemnification arising
from agreement in Missouri, see, e.g., Moberly v. Leonard, 339 Mo. 791, 99 S.W.2d
58 (1936) (contract); Govero v. Standard Oil Co., 192 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1951)
(lease). Rights of indemnification conferred by rule of law in Missouri are col-
lected in Wright, supra.
7. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 41.03 provides that the civil rules ". shall be construed
to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Com-
pare rule 51.01 which states that "[t]hese Rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the Courts of Missouri, or the venue of civil actions
therein." Article V, § 5 of the Missouri Constitution authorizes the supreme court
to promulgate the rules of procedure for all courts in the state, provided it does
not thereby change, inter alia, any substantive rights. The 1959 committee note
to rule 51.01, see V.A.M.R. 51.01, at 27-28 (1970), observes that venue might not
be substantive in the sense of the above constitutional prohibition, but that the
issue is nevertheless avoided by the mandate of strict construction with respect
to venue and jurisdiction in rule 51.01.
8. State ex tel. Boll v. Weinstein, 365 Mo. 1179, 295 S.W.2d 62 (En Banc
1956); State ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 361 Mo. 1029, 238 S.W.2d 393 (En Banc
1951).9. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 54.13 (c).
10. The foundation case in Missouri is Yates v. Casteel, 329 Mo. 1101, 49
S.W.2d 68 (1932). For recent affirmations of Casteel, see, e.g., State ex reL Bowden
v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. En Banc 1962); State ex rel. Boll v. Weinstein,
365 Mo. 1179, 295 S.W.2d 62 (En Banc 1956). In addition, the foregoing cases
add the refinement that service must be had upon the defendant within the county
of venue. Id. But see note 13 infra.
1976]
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cepts."1 Jurisdiction is grounded in the state's inherent power to adjudi-
cate the controversy, whereas the purpose of venue is to allocate the place
of trial for the convenience of the parties and their witnesses. 12 The
distinction generally has not been recognized in Missouri.' 8 In an action
against a single defendant, a Missouri court is without jurisdiction unless
suit is brought in a county of proper venue and service is had upon the
defendant in that county.14 And if two or more defendants are joined
in an action, the venue statutes must be complied with as to each de-
fendant, though joinder is otherwise appropriate. Where the co-defendants
reside in different counties, suit may be brought in any such county and
venue will be proper with respect to each.15 But where the co-defendants
reside in the same county, suit must be brought in that county or each co-
defendant must be found in the county of the plaintiff's residence.' 0
Missouri case law has, however, carved out an apparent exception
for counterclaims which are "incidental to the main claim."'17 The inci-
11. See, e.g., Alamida v. Wilson, 58 Hawaii 398, 495 P.2d 585 (1972); Associ-
ated Grocers of Alabama v. Graves Co., 272 Ala. 158, 130 So. 2d 17 (1961).
12. Alamida v. Wilson, 53 Hawaii 398, 495 P.2d 585 (1972).
13. See note 10 supra. But cf. State ex tel. Union Elec. Co. v. Scott, 470
S.W.2d 1 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971) which contains dictum supporting the distinc-
tion where venue was not under attack.
To the extent that process may be served in a county other than that in which
suit is properly brought, jurisdiction is not identified with venue in Missouri.
In impleader, the third-party petition may be served in a county other than that
in which the original claim was brought following Garrison. Garrison overruled
sub silentio the corollary of the rule in State ex -el. Carney v. Higgins, 352 S.W.2d
35 (Mo. En Banc 1961), which permitted service of the third-party petition only
in the county in which suit was properly brought. Service of the third-party
petition will probably be restricted to an individual third-party defendant's resi-
dence or the corporate place of business, as in Garrison, though Garrison does not
address the point.
Process may also be served outside the county of venue in cases where the
venue is prescribed by § 508.010 (2), RSMo 1969, see note 15 infra, and where
venue is laid in the county where the cause of action accrued under the corpora-
tions statute, § 508.040, RSMo 1969. See State ex rel. Carney v. Higgins, 352 S.W.2d
35 (Mo. En Banc 1961); State ex rel. Baker v. Goodman, 364 Mo. 1202, 274 S.W.2d
293 (En Banc 1954). In both Carney and Baker, the process was served at the
defendant's principal place of business, the alternative county of venue under
the corporations venue statute. Presumably, service outside the alternative county
of venue in either situation would be invalid under §§ 508.040 and 508.010 (2),
RSMo 1969.
14. Yates v. Casteel, 329 Mo. 1101, 49 S.W.2d 68 (1932). Cf. Hankins v.
Smarr, 345 Mo. 973, 137 S.W.2d 499 (1940) (dictum).
15. Section 508.010 (2), RSMo 1969. As the statute necessarily contemplates,
the defendants residing in counties other than that of suit may be served outside
the county in which suit is brought. See State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield, 340
S.W.2d 631 (Mo. En Banc 1960).
16. State ex Tel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 361 Mo. 1029, 288 S.W.2d 393 (En
Banc 1951); cf. Hankins v. Smarr, 345 Mo. 973, 137 S.W.2d 499 (1940). In that
situation, § 508.010 (1), RSMo 1969, applies, and "defendant" is construed in the
collective sense. See Bartlett supra.
17. See Hewitt v. Price, 204 Mo. 31, 102 S.W. 647 (1907) which was a suit
to recover the balance due following foreclosure of a deed of trust. The defendant,
served in the county of suit where venue had been properly laid, filed an equitable
counterclaim affecting title to the real property secured by the deed of trust.
[Vol. 41
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dental or ancillary venue concept is not inconsistent with the Missouri
holdings that condition jurisdiction on proper venue. The filing of a
counterclaim need not be accompanied by service of process because the
person against whom it is asserted is already a party to the action.' 8
"Improper venue" with respect to a counterclaim19 does not, therefore,
affect jurisdiction. The incidental venue concept illustrates the ancillary
treatment accorded counterclaims where jurisdiction would not be violated.
Further, the plaintiff has undertaken to bring suit in the county in which
the counterclaim is filed. It would, therefore, add nothing to insist on
proper venue with respect to the counterclaim if the goal of venue is
convenience. The application of the ancillary venue principle to counter-
claims provides an example of the subservience of the statutory venue
provisions where the often-competing policies of judicial economy and
consistency are at stake.
Where the defendant files a claim against a third party, i.e., in
impleader, venue as to that claim had been independent until the court
in Garrison overruled State ex rel. Carney v. Higgins.20 In Higgins, plaintiff
homeowners hired defendant corporation to construct a basement under
their house in Clay County, Missouri. The defendant subcontracted the
excavation to the third-party defendant, who struck one of the structural
supports, causing the house to collapse. The plaintiff brought suit against
the contractor in Clay County, where the cause of action had accrued,
and the contractor was properly served under the corporations venue
statute. The defendant filed a third-party petition alleging negligence
against the subcontractor who was served at his residence in Jackson
County. The court held that the general venue statute was applicable to
the impleader claim, barring suit against the subcontractor in Clay County
Since the real estate was situated in a different county, the plaintiff objected
to the venue of the counterclaim pursuant to the forerunner of the current
"local" venue statute, § 508.030, RSMo 1969. Section 508.030 provides that suits
affecting the title to real estate shall be brought in the county in which the
real estate is situated. The court held that the special venue statute did not apply
to a counterclaim which raised the question of title to real propery when it
was merely incidental to the main claim.
18. It is actually a non sequitur to speak of proper venue with respect to
a counterclaim. The general venue statute applies only to "suits instituted by
summons... ." § 508.010, RSMo 1969. A counterclaim is not instituted by sum-
mons. See note 19 infra. Section 508.040, RSMo 1969, directs in which counties
"... [s]uits against corporations shall be commenced .. " Unless a counterclaim
can be viewed as a suit being commenced against the (corporate) plaintiff, then
§ 508.040 is also inapplicable to counterclaims. Since the legislature has not
provided a venue statute to govern counterclaims, insistence upon proper venue
with respect to a counterclaim would appear to be illogical.
Nevertheless, given Hewitt, note 17 supra, and the confusion of venue andjurisdiction in Missouri, venue of counterclaims may be something to be reckoned
with.
19. The defendant must only serve a copy of the pleading upon the plaintiff.
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 43.01. The plaintiff's voluntary appearance before the court will
confer jurisdiction over his person. See State ex rel. Lindell Tower Apartments
v. Guise, 357 Mo. 50, 206 S.W.2d 320 (1947).
20. 352 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. En Banc 1961).
1976]
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where venue was proper in the main claim.21 The court rejected the
ancillary venue concept and established instead an independent venue
requirement in impleader. Curiously, however, the court added that its
decision did not mean that there could never be a third-party claim so
"inseparably linked with, and ancillary to, the original suit as to derive
proper venue therefrom." 22
In part, the Higgins court felt that allowing the venue in a third-party
claim to rest upon that established in the main claim would be an un-
warranted judicial enlargement of the venue statute. It also feared that
ancillary venue would lead to serious abuses of process. The court in Gar-
rison was untroubled by either ground in overruling Higgins' independent
venue requirement in impleader. The effect of the Higgins rule was to
frustrate the policy underlying third-party practice,23 which fosters con-
sistent results and economy of litigation through the avoidance of multiple
actions involving identical or similar evidence.24 The court concluded
that the legislature could not have intended such a substantial obstacle-
that of an independent venue requirement-to the usefulness of impleader.
Like the federal courts addressing the issue,25 the Garrison court resolved
the textual difficulties in favor of furthering the policy of impleader and
ignored the mandate of strict construction of rules affecting venue.
The court noted that in abandoning the technical and the useless,
the rights of the litigants were still safeguarded because allowance of a
third-party petition is discretionary with the trial judge.2 6 Potential abuses
of process can be curbed at the trial level because the court may in its
discretion withhold permission to file a third-party petition even if the
claim is one within the language of the impleader rule.2 7 Or the third-
21. Missouri had previously reached this result in Memphis Bank and Trust
Co. v. West, 260 S.W.2d 866 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953) (replevin action against
bona fide purchaser; third-party claim against the vendor for fraud). The courtheld that the impleader statute [superseded by Mo. Sup. CT. R. 52.11 (a)] did
not extend the general venue statute, so service upon the third-party defendant
in a county other than that in which the suit was properly filed did not confer
personal jurisdiction over him.
22. 352 S.W.2d 35, 39. Yet Higgins would seem to be precisely such a case
where the third-party claim was "inseparately linked with" the original claim.
23. In a Georgia case reaching the Higgins result on state constitutional
grounds, Register v. Stone's Independent Oil Distribs., Inc., 227 Ga. 123, 179
S.E.2d 68 (1971), one commentator felt that the holding "basically eliminated
third-party practice in Georgia." 23 MERnca L. Rrv. 667, 670 (1972). Clearly,
an independent venue requirement severely limits the use of impleader.
24. 528 S.W.2d at 442, approving the language in State ex rel. Laclede Gas
Co. v. Godfrey, 468 S.W.2d 693, 698 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
25. See text accompanying note 7 supra. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
contain provisions corresponding to the sections governing interpretation of the
Missouri rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 and 82. The federal courts have virutally
ignored rule 82, which requires interpretations that do not affect venue. Ancillary
Process and Venue in The Federal Courts, 73 H~Auv. L. REv. 1164 (1960).
26. 528 S.W.2d at 442.
27. State ex rel. Green v. Kimberlin, 517 S.W.2d 124 (Mo. En Banc 1974),
Where the impleader would cause great inconvenience to the third-party de-
fendant, it should be denied. Southern Milling Co. v. United States, 270 F.2d
80 (5th Cir. 1959). The trial court's discretion is not unlimited, however, and
[Vol. 41
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party claim could be severed from the action at a later stage upon a
showing of inconvenience to the impleaded party.28 In addition, the
requirement of jurisdiction over the person of the third-party defendant
establishes a measure of convenience to him which cannot be reduced. 29
Formerly, a Missouri defendant whose potential third-party defendant
was protected by the independent venue barrier could only avail himself
of the common law device of vouching to warranty, or "vouching in,"
as it is commonly known. "Vouching in,"30 which was supplemented but
not superseded by third-party practice, 3 is a technique whereby an in-
demnitee may bind an indemnitor as to the existence and amount of the
indemnitee's liability established in a suit against him. The indemnitee
must give the indemnitor notice of the action, the opportunity to defend,
and the control and management of the defense of the suit. 2 Whether
or not the indemnitor appears, in a subsequent suit against him to enforce
the right of indemnification, he is bound by the necessary determinations
in the original suit by operation of collateral estoppel8 5
The drawback of "vouching in" is that if the indemnitor refuses to
voluntarily discharge his obligation, two suits are required instead of
one. In impleader, the third party is a formal party to the action and
must be exercised on sound legal principles. State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v.
Godfrey, 468 S.W.2d 693, 698 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
28. See Mo. Sup. CT. L 52.11 (a); Globig v. Greene &¢ Gust Co., 184 F. Supp.
530 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
29. Mo. Sup. CT. P. 52.11 (a) requires the third-party plaintiff to cause a
summons and petition to be served upon the person not a party to the suit who
is or may be liable to him. The federal cases are in accord. See 6 C. Wmiour &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAaTCE AND PROC-DURE § 1445, at 237 (1971) and authori-
ties cited therein. Clearly, however, service of a third-party petition in a county
where venue was improper prior to Garrison is now valid in Missouri. See note
13 supra.
80. See generally 3 J. MOORE, FEDEAL PRAcncx ff 14.02 (2d ed. 1974). See
also §§ 400.2-607 (5) (a), .2-607 (6), .3-803, RSMo 1969.
31. See Wright, supra, note 6.
32. Although the procedure in actions under the Uniform Commercial Code
is slightly different, see, e.g., § 400.3-803, RSMo 1969, the case law suggests that
all three conditions must be met to preclude relitigation of the issues in the
underlying suit. Springfield v. Clement, 205 Mo. App. 114, 225 S.W. 120 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1920) (notice); Lane v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 343 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.
Mo. 1972) (opportunity to defend); Drennen v. Wren, 416 S.W.2d 229 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1967) (control and management). The judgment does not, of course,
have collateral estoppel effect if obtained by fraud or collusion. Id.
The notification must adequately apprise the third party of his opportunity
to appear, but little formality is required. See U.S. Wire & Cable Corp. v. Ascher
Corp., 34 N.J. 121, 167 A.2d 633 (1961).
33. The issues which he would not be precluded from litigating in the second
suit are the existence of a relationship or agreement giving a right over; fraud
in obtaining a right of indemnification; breach of an essential condition by the
indemnitee; any defense that the indemnitor could not interpose in the original
action; and incidental or collateral issues in the original suit though they might
have been determined. Drennan v. Wren, 416 S.W.2d 229 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the indemnitor is bound by any factual
determinations common to both suits, not just those necessary to the determina-
tion of the first suit. See, e.g., § 400.3-803, RSMo 1969.
6
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is therefore bound by the judgment, so only one suit is required. A party
who is "vouched in," however, is not a named party to the original suit.
Consequently, after the determination of the voucher's liability, the vouch-
er must bring a subsequent action to enforce his right of indemnification
against the vouchee by proving the judgment, notice, and that the claim
is within the indemnity obligation.3 4
The obvious value of the "vouching in" device is that it may be used
where it is impossible to acquire personal jurisdiction over the indemnitor.
It will also serve as a means of binding the indemnitor in a limited sense
where the court in its discretion denies leave to file a third-party petition.
Thus, "vouching in" should not be overlooked where the more efficient
impleader device is not feasible.
In Garrison, Missouri joined the weight of authority in viewing venue
of a third-party claim as ancillary in impleader.8 5 The decision also im-
plicitly adopted the preferred position that once venue is properly laid
in the main action, a showing of proper venue between the plaintiff and
the third-party defendant is not necessary. 6 In Missouri now, in an
impleader action the third party may be bound by the judgment where
venue would have been improper if compliance with the venue statutes
had been required.
The holding in Garrison is a progressive development in Missouri law
and greatly expands the potential of impleader, which is preferable to
34. 1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE, f 0.405[9] (2d ed. 1974). The nature of
the voucher's liability will ordinarily be determined in the original action and
will be conclusive in the second suit. The question in the second suit is whether
the liability which has become fixed is within the scope of the indemnity obliga-
tion. Id.
Another drawback of "vouching in" is that the indemnitee must surrender con-
trol of the defense of his suit if the indemnitor chooses to manage the suit. Shawe
v. Wendy Wilson, Inc. 25 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
35. See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 693 (1965) for a collection of state and federal
authorities. Except for a handful of dated cases, see, e.g., Habina v. M. A. Henry
Co., 8 F.R.D. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), federal cases hold that venue in third-party
practice is ancillary to that of the main claim. The leading case is United'States
v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1954). Federal courts have analogized to the
concept of ancillary jurisdiction, concluding that if constitutional limitations
on subject matter jurisdiction do not apply to third-party claims, a fortiori
statutory rules allocating place of trial do not. See Ancillary Process and Venue
in the Federal Courts, 73 HARV. L. Rxv. 1164, 1168 (1960).
Since the federal impleader rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 14, is virtually identical
to the language adopted in Mo. Sup. CT. R. 52.11 (a), after Garrison Missouri no
longer has the curious result of the "same rule in text but not in meaning."
23 MERCR L. R.v. 667, 671 (1972).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1954); 6
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1445, at 243 (1971).
Venue would have been improper between the parties to the third-party petition
because the corporations venue statute was not complied with. For the same
reason, venue would have been improper vis-a-vis the plaintiff and the third-
party defendant. Neither the plaintiff nor the third-party defendant in Garrison
asserted a claim against the other arising out of the subject matter of the original
claim. Where' such a permissive right is asserted, see Mo. Sup. CT. R. 52.11 (a),
venue should continue to rest upon venue properly shown upon the original
claim. See 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE ff 14.28[3] (2d ed. 1974).
[Vol. 41
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